Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

Samuel Bentolila, Juan Dolado and Atilano Jorge Padilla

No 987, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this paper we develop a fully game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in the labour and product markets, the business cycle and economic policy. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.

Keywords: Bargaining; Strategic Complementarity; Strategic Substitutability; Wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 J30 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1996)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1996)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1994)
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