Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

A. Jorge Padilla, Samuel Bentolila and Juan Dolado

Working Papers from Banco de España

Abstract: In this paper we develop a game-theoretic version of the "right-to-manage" model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables.

Keywords: WAGES; LABOUR MARKET; INDUSTRY; TRADE UNIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 J30 J50 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1996)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1994)
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bde:wpaper:9616

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