COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Martin Brown, Armin Falk and Ernst Fehr

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2012, vol. 10, issue 4, 887-907

Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device (2011)
Working Paper: Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device (2008)
Working Paper: Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device (2008)
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