Legal Determinants of External Finance

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (), Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

Journal of Finance, 1997, vol. 52, issue 3, 1131-50

Abstract: Using a sample of forty-nine countries, the authors show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries. Coauthors are Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.

Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance,"
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