Legal Determinants of External Finance

Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Robert W. Vishny

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

Date: 1997
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Published in The Journal of Finance

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30728041/w5879.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance,"
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:30728041

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