Legal Determinants of External Finance

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez- de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ()

No 5879, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

JEL-codes: E G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3862)

Published as Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, no. 3 (1997): 1131-1150.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance
Working Paper: Legal Determinants of External Finance,"
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