The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple‐Cost‐Single‐Benefit” Projects under Unilateral Information

Nava Kahana, Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 11, issue 6, 947-960

Abstract: This paper focuses on indivisible “multiple‐cost‐single‐benefit” projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01440.x

Related works:
Working Paper: The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information (2009)
Working Paper: The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:947-960

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