The Efficient and Fair Approval of "Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit" Projects under Unilateral Information

Nava Kahana (), Yosef Mealem () and Shmuel Nitzan
Additional contact information
Nava Kahana: Bar-Ilan University
Yosef Mealem: Netanya Academic College

No 4181, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs.

Keywords: single beneficiary; indivisible project; efficient and fair implementation; multiple-cost bearers; unilateral information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-ppm
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Published - published in: Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11 (6), 947 - 960

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple‐Cost‐Single‐Benefit” Projects under Unilateral Information (2009)
Working Paper: The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost-Single-Benefit” Projects Under Unilateral Information (2009)
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