Public Funding of Political Parties

Ignacio Ortuno‐ortín and Christian Schultz ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ignacio Ortuno Ortin

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 7, issue 5, 781-791

Abstract: This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. These funds finance electoral campaigns. It is shown that such a funding system increases policy convergence. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. If the parties have access to other means of campaign finance given in a lump‐sum way, the effect is moderated.

Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00244.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Funding of Political Parties (2000)
Working Paper: Public Funding of Political Parties (2000)
Working Paper: PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:5:p:781-791

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