Public Funding of Political Parties

Christian Schultz () and Ignacio Ortuno-OrtÍn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ignacio Ortuno Ortin

No 368, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public Funding of Political Parties (2005)
Working Paper: Public Funding of Political Parties (2000)
Working Paper: PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_368

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