On the Frequency of Interior Cournot–Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Wolfgang Peters

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 3, 401-408

Abstract: In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x

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Working Paper: On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:401-408

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