On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Wolfgang Peters

No 982, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income distributions for which an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium will result in which every agent makes a strictly positive contribution to the public good. This formula is then applied to a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function showing that the likelihood of interior Cournot-Nash equilibria falls dramatically when the number of individuals is increased. The implications this result might have for the significance of Shibata-Warr neutrality are finally discussed.

Keywords: private provision of public goods; Cournot-Nash equilibria; Shibata-Warr neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp982.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the Frequency of Interior Cournot–Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_982

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().