Employers' Efforts to Deter Shirking in Teams: Evidence from Job Vacancies

Vera Brencic

LABOUR, 2015, vol. 29, issue 1, 52-78

Abstract: Employers can use profit sharing to elicit effort in teams as long as shirking is sufficiently costly. Analysis of descriptions of job vacancies from the online job board monster.com reveals that the threat of shirking does not deter employers from offering profit sharing to reward workers in teams. However, when team work is prevalent, employers are more likely to advertise a work environment where shirking is easier to detect and penalize. We do not find evidence of similar employers' efforts to deter shirking in teams if jobs entail: frequent interactions with a supervisor, volunteering, or work for a non-profit organization.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/labr.12038 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:labour:v:29:y:2015:i:1:p:52-78

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1121-7081

Access Statistics for this article

LABOUR is currently edited by Franco Peracchi

More articles in LABOUR from CEIS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().