Agency Theory and Work from Home

Dustin White

LABOUR, 2019, vol. 33, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: Wages for individuals working from home have converged toward, and even exceeded, those of office‐workers. I argue that these changes are driven by the ability of firms to monitor employees working from home. Using American Community Survey and Census data spanning 1980–2014, I find wage differentials have shifted from a 26 per cent penalty in 1980 to a 5 per cent premium in 2014. Furthermore, I find that higher wage variance (44 per cent greater in 1980) for home‐workers disappears by 2013. Changes in variance suggest that the falling cost of monitoring employee effort has made it less costly for firms to allow work from home. These findings support agency theory as a driver of the changes in wages and wage structure for individuals working from home.

Date: 2019
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