A note on endogenous competition mode with managerial†unionized firms

Nicola Meccheri () and Luciano Fanti

Metroeconomica, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, 60-69

Abstract: We analyse the endogenous choice of the competition mode (price vs. quantity) in a duopoly model with managerial delegation and unionized labor markets. Depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation, the set of possible outcomes proves to be very rich, including alternatively a unique quantity or price equilibrium as well as multiple asymmetric†type equilibria.

Date: 2018
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