 Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate GovernanceMartin Conyon and Dennis Leech Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 1994, vol. 56, issue 3, 229-47 Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between top director pay, company performance and corporate governance in a sample of 294 U.K. companies between 1983 and 1986. The reported econometric results reveal that although a statistically significant relationship can be established between the growth in highest paid director salary and shareholder wealth, the estimated elasticity is quantitatively very small. In line with other research, company sales is important in explaining top pay. The paper shows that measures of corporate governance play no role in shaping the growth in top directors pay, although there is some evidence that the level of pay is lower in ownership controlled firms or where shareholder concentration is high. On the other hand where the primary shareholders are insurance companies and pension funds, or where the company separates the role of CEO and chairman there is no statistical effect on top pay. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd Date: 1994 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:obuest:v:56:y:1994:i:3:p:229-47 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Christopher Adam, Anindya Banerjee, Christopher Bowdler, David Hendry, Adriaan Kalwij, John Knight and Jonathan Temple More articles in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics from Department of Economics, University of Oxford Contact information at EDIRC. |
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