Self‐screening Effects of Monitoring: Evidence from a Quasi Experiment in the Swedish Temporary Parental Benefit Program

Iida Häkkinen Skans and Per Johansson

Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2018, vol. 80, issue 5, 893-904

Abstract: Monitoring and screening have been shown to be important to reduce moral hazard in social insurances. This paper empirically investigates whether monitoring in the Swedish temporary parental benefit program affects future benefit take‐up. Identification is based on the fact that parents’ benefit applications are monitored randomly by the insurer. The estimation results show that parents who are monitored are less likely to apply again in the near future.

Date: 2018
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