Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications

Pierre Chiappori, Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié and François Salanié

RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 37, issue 4, 783-798

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications (2002)
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