Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications

Pierre Chiappori, Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié and François Salanié

No 2002-42, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications (2006)
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