A Public Choice Approach to Strategic and Nonstrategic Environmental Policy

Stefan Csordas ()

Review of International Economics, 2010, vol. 18, issue 5, 1001-1011

Abstract: In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental policy and international environmental agreements. We examine cooperative and noncooperative environmental policies under governments that are either welfare maximizers (“good dictators”) or tax revenue maximizers (“Leviathans”). We show that Leviathans can perform better in terms of welfare and that good dictators can set higher taxes. We then analyze international environmental agreements and show that the breakdown of environmental cooperation can indeed lead to a welfare gain for all signatory countries. Considering a delegation game between governments, we find that a Pareto‐superior Leviathan outcome can be the unique Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00922.x

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