Implementing Market Access

Kala Krishna (), Suddhasatwa Roy and Marie Thursby

Review of International Economics, 1998, vol. 6, issue 4, 529-44

Abstract: This paper examines ex post subsidies as a means of enforcing market share targets. Subsidies set after firms make their strategic decisions are shown to create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices. These effects are stronger when targets, and hence subsidies, are specified on a firm-specific rather than industry-wide basis. This occurs because firms perceive themselves as subject to more competition (i.e., more elastic demand) in the latter case. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Implementaing Market Access (1996)
Working Paper: Implementing Market Access (1996)
Working Paper: Implementing Market Access (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:6:y:1998:i:4:p:529-44

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().