Implementing Market Access

Kala Krishna (kmk4@psu.edu), Suddhasatwa Roy and Marie Thursby

No 5593, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum market share requirements. Both taxes and subsidies chosen by the home government after firms have picked prices create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that are similar in nature to those found with quotas/VERs. We show that some degree of imprecision in implementing the target engenders less anticompetitive outcomes relative to perfect enforcement.

JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Review of International Economics, Vol.6, no.4 (1998): 529-544.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5593.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Implementing Market Access (1998)
Working Paper: Implementaing Market Access (1996)
Working Paper: Implementing Market Access (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5593

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5593

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (wpc@nber.org).