Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation

Simon Gächter and Armin Falk

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 104, issue 1, 1-26

Abstract: Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one‐shot and repeated) of a gift‐exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long‐term interaction is a “reciprocity‐compatible” contract enforcement device. JEL classification: J30; C91

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations (2001)
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