Do new entrants sustain, destroy, or create guaranteed profitability?

Glenn MacDonald and Michael Ryall

Strategic Management Journal, 2018, vol. 39, issue 6, 1630-1649

Abstract: Research and Managerial Summary: We examine the effect of any new agent on the value captured by an incumbent: e.g., a new rival, a new source of supply, a new customer, etc. Regardless of the new agent's type, entry has two opposing effects on the incumbent's minimum profitability guaranteed by competition. First, is the creation of more economic value. This tends to blunt competition and lowers minimum guaranteed profit. Second, is the potential generation of new productive alternatives for the incumbent, thereby inducing the opposite effect. We describe whether entry allows guaranteed profits to persist or creates guaranteed profits when they did not previously exist. We show that knowing that the entrant can replace the incumbent is not enough to determine the impact of entry on guaranteed minimum profits.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2770

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:stratm:v:39:y:2018:i:6:p:1630-1649

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0143-2095

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Management Journal from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().