Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union

Victor Ginsburgh and Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

The World Economy, 2018, vol. 41, issue 7, 1775-1789

Abstract: We discuss compensation schemes that should give incentives to EU countries and citizens to acquire a lingua franca. We consider three possible candidate languages: English, French and German, which are already the most widely spoken languages. In our model, countries can claim compensations linked to the number of (young) citizens who do not speak a given candidate language, and the distance between the official language in the country and the suggested lingua franca. We study two sharing schemes that are rooted in ancient sources: the Aristotelian proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The former prevents coalitional manipulations among countries, whereas the latter guarantees meaningful lower bounds in the sharing process for all countries.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12644

Related works:
Working Paper: Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
Working Paper: Compensation Schemes for Learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
Working Paper: Compensation Schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:worlde:v:41:y:2018:i:7:p:1775-1789

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