Compensation Schemes for Learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union

Victor Ginsburgh and Juan Moreno-Ternero

No 18.05, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We discuss compensation schemes that should give incentives to EU countries and citizens to acquire a lingua franca. We consider three possible candidate languages: English, French and German, which are already the most widely spoken languages. In our model, countries can claim compensations linked to the number of (young) citizens who do not speak a given candidate language, and the distance between the official language in the country and the suggested lingua franca. We study two sharing schemes that are rooted in ancient sources: the Aristotelian proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The former prevents coalitional manipulations among countries, whereas the latter guarantees meaningful lower bounds in the sharing process for all countries.

Keywords: European Union; lingua franca; compensation schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
Working Paper: Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
Working Paper: Compensation Schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:18.05

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