Compensation Schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union
Victor Ginsburgh () and
Juan Moreno-Ternero ()
No ECARES 2017-07, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
We discuss compensation schemes that should give incentives to EU countries and citizens to acquire a lingua franca. We consider three possible candidates: English, French and German, which are already the most widely spoken languages. In our model, countries can claim compensations linked to the number of citizens who do not speak a given candidate language, and the distance between the official language in the country and the suggested lingua franca. We study two sharing schemes that are rooted in ancient sources: the Aristotelian proportional rule and the Talmud rule. The former prevents coalitional manipulations among countries, whereas the latter guarantees meaningful lower bounds for all countries.
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Journal Article: Compensation schemes for learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
Working Paper: Compensation Schemes for Learning a Lingua Franca in the European Union (2018)
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