Monotone Preferences over Information

Juan Dubra () and Federico Echenique

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2001, vol. 1, issue 1, 18

Abstract: We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

Keywords: value of information; Blackwell’s Theorem; representation theorems; monotone preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1033

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