Monotone Preferences over Information

Juan Dubra () and Federico Echenique

No 1297, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

Keywords: Value of information; Blackwell's theorem; representation theorems; monotone preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D11 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2001-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Monotone Preferences Over Information (2004)
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