Monotone Preferences over Information
Juan Dubra () and
Federico Echenique ()
No 1297, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
Keywords: Value of information; Blackwell's theorem; representation theorems; monotone preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D11 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Monotone Preferences Over Information (2004)
Journal Article: Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1297
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