Monotone Preferences Over Information
Juan Dubra () and
Federico Echenique ()
Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
JEL-codes: C70 G12 C60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)
Working Paper: Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm405
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().