Monotone Preferences Over Information

Juan Dubra () and Federico Echenique

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

JEL-codes: C60 C70 G12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
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Related works:
Journal Article: Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)
Working Paper: Monotone Preferences over Information (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm405

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