On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers

Tim Friehe and Gabuthy Yannick ()
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Gabuthy Yannick: University of Lorraine, Nancy, Lothringen, France

Review of Law & Economics, 2019, vol. 15, issue 3, 20

Abstract: This paper analyzes a litigation contest in which the plaintiff’s lawyer and the defendant choose effort. The plaintiff selects the relative importance of a contract component related to the judgment (similar to contingent fees) and a component related to the lawyer’s efforts (similar to conditional fees) to ensure lawyer participation and guide the lawyer’s decision-making. For our setup, we find that the plaintiff considers the component related to the lawyer’s effort to be the relatively more desirable instrument in the light of its effort-inducing and cost characteristics. However, high levels of the lawyer’s outside utility may limit the role of this component.

Keywords: litigation; agency; contest; compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Working Paper: On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers (2018)
Working Paper: On plaintiff preferences regarding methods of compensating lawyers (2018)
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0008

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