On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers

Tim Friehe and Yannick Gabuthy ()
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Yannick Gabuthy: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper analyzes a litigation contest in which the plaintiff's lawyer and the defendant choose effort. The plaintiff selects the relative importance of a contract component related to the judgment (similar to contingent fees) and a component related to the lawyer's efforts (similar to conditional fees) to ensure lawyer participation and guide the lawyer's decision-making. For our setup, we find that the plaintiff considers the component related to the lawyer's effort to be the relatively more desirable instrument in the light of its effort-inducing and cost characteristics. However, high levels of the lawyer's outside utility may limit the role of this component.

Keywords: Litigation; Agency; Contest; Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers (2019)
Working Paper: On plaintiff preferences regarding methods of compensating lawyers (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02443814

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0008

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