On plaintiff preferences regarding methods of compensating lawyers

Tim Friehe and Yannick Gabuthy

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: This paper analyzes a litigation contest in which the plaintiff’s lawyer and the defendant choose effort. The plaintiff selects the relative importance of a contract component related to the judgment (similar to contingent fees) and a component related to the lawyer’s efforts (similar to conditional fees) to ensure lawyer participation and guide the lawyer’s decision-making. For our setup, we find that the plaintiff considers the component related to the lawyer’s effort to be the relatively more desirable instrument in the light of its effort-inducing and cost characteristics. However, high levels of the lawyer’s outside utility may limit the role of this component.

Keywords: Litigation; Agency; Contest; Compensation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2018/2018-40.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers (2019)
Working Paper: On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2018-40

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