Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Winand Emons and Claude Fluet

Revue économique, 2020, vol. 71, issue 3, 429-457

Abstract: An arbiter has to decide a case under a purely adversarial procedure. He can do so using his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties can distort the evidence in their favor at a cost. In equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies; the testimony is, however, distorted. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this result with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure where the arbiter decides how much testimony he wants to hear. JEL Codes: D82, K41, K42.

Keywords: evidence production; procedure; costly state falsification; adversarial; inquisitorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_713_0429 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2020-3-page-429.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2011)
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2009)
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_713_0429

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().