Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Winand Emons and Claude Fluet

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure where it is for the arbiter to decide how much testimony he wants to hear.

Keywords: Evidence production; procedure; costly state falsification; adversarial; inquisitorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2020)
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2009)
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1122

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