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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony

Winand Emons () and Claude Fluet ()

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure (Emons and Fluet 2009). We provide sufficient conditions on when one procedure is better than the other one.

Keywords: evidence production; procedure; costly state falsification; adversarial; inquisitorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2009-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0904

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