Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies

Ludovic Julien () and Fabrice Tricou

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2010, vol. 76, issue 2, 175-194

Abstract: This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium. JEL Classification : D43, D51

Keywords: general equilibrium; oligopolistic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies (2010)
Working Paper: Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies (2010)
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