Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies

Ludovic Julien () and Fabrice Tricou
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Fabrice Tricou: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and of strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

Keywords: Oligopoly equilibria; Stackelberg; Economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Published in Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2010, 76 (2), pp.175-194. ⟨10.3917/rel.762.0175⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies (2010)
Working Paper: Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01228027

DOI: 10.3917/rel.762.0175

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