Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies
Ludovic Julien () and
Fabrice Tricou
Additional contact information
Fabrice Tricou: Economix, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre
No 2010023, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
Abstract:
This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and the strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.
Keywords: General equilibrium; Oligopolistic Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2010-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2010023.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies (2010) 
Working Paper: Oligopoly equilibria ‘à la Stackelberg’ in pure exchange economies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010023
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