The bargaining family revisited

Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 33, issue 2, 471-487

Abstract: We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall-back. One finding is that overinvestment in education may be even more of a problem in such a semi-cooperative model than in a fully non-cooperative one. Even though both the semi-cooperative model and the fully non-cooperative model predict overinvestment in education, policy conclusions that follow from the two models are distinctly different.

JEL-codes: D13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (120)

Downloads: (external link)
https://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%282000 ... ATBFR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8 (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
Working Paper: The Bargaining Family Revisited (2000)
Working Paper: The Bargaining Family Revisited (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:471-487

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().