The Bargaining Family Revisited

Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall-back. One finding is that overinvestment in education may be even more of a problem in such a semi-cooperative model than in a fully non-cooperative one. Even though both the semi-cooperative model and the fully non-cooperative model predict overinvestment in education, policy conclusions that follow from the two models are distinctly different.

Keywords: HOME WORK; LABOUR MARKET; FAMILY BARGAINING MODEL; COOPERATIVE MODEL (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (116)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The bargaining family revisited (2000)
Working Paper: The Bargaining Family Revisited (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:212

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().