The Bargaining Family Revisited

Kai Konrad and Kjell Lommerud ()

No 1312, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall back. Several authors have claimed that non-cooperative behaviour is a more appropriate fall back in family bargaining than utilities as single. We argue that the empirical implications of the two approaches are quite parallel. A second finding is that over-investment in education may be even more of a problem in our mixed cooperative-non-cooperative model than in a fully non-cooperative one.

Keywords: Education; Family Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J22 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: The bargaining family revisited (2000)
Working Paper: The Bargaining Family Revisited (2000)
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