Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 1907
Jon Moen () and
Ellis Tallman
The Journal of Economic History, 2000, vol. 60, issue 1, 145-163
Abstract:
Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawls from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balnace-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find ecidence that clearinghouse memebers had institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse, were subject to heightened perceptions of risk, and suffered large-scale withdrawals because they were outside of the clearinghouse and therefore much less prepared to withstand large-scale depositor runs. We suggest that this aspect of the Panic of 1907 helped to forge support for the creation of a U.S. central bank.
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Business cycles and financial crises: the roles of credit supply and demand shocks (2012) 
Working Paper: Clearinghouse access and bank runs: trust companies in New York and Chicago during the Panic of 1907 (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:60:y:2000:i:01:p:145-163_02
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