A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses

Leandro Arozamena and Federico Weinschelbaum

Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 24, 1-5

Abstract: We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.

Keywords: Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses (2006)
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