A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses
Leandro Arozamena () and
Federico Weinschelbaum ()
Economics Bulletin, 2006, vol. 4, issue 24, 1-5
We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.
Keywords: Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d40010
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().