A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses

Federico Weinschelbaum and Leandro Arozamena

No 92, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.

Keywords: political economy; structural reforms; Argentina (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07, Revised 2006-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No. 24, pp. 1-5

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Journal Article: A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:92

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