A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses
Federico Weinschelbaum () and
Leandro Arozamena ()
No 92, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia
We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.
Keywords: political economy; structural reforms; Argentina (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07, Revised 2006-07
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Published in Economic Bulletin, Vol.4, No. 24, pp. 1-5
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Journal Article: A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:92
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