Preemption, Start-Up Decisions and the Firms' Capital Structure

Paolo Panteghini and Michele Moretto

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 39, 1-14

Abstract: In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions.

Keywords: capital; structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Preemption, Start-Up Decisions and the Firms’ Capital Structure (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d90003

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