Preemption, Start-Up Decisions and the Firms’ Capital Structure

Michele Moretto and Paolo Panteghini

No 2006, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions.

Keywords: capital structure; irreversibility; preemption; real options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D92 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Preemption, Start-Up Decisions and the Firms' Capital Structure (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2006

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