A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing

Justin Ross

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 9, issue 29, 1-8

Abstract: This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives d by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research.

Keywords: Standardized; Testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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