Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty
Jason Shogren () and
Andrew Moravec ()
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Andrew Moravec: University of Minnesota Institute of Technology
Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 2018-2024
We compare behavior in a one-shot Centipede game across several payoff structures including nonlinear payoff tournaments. Assuming Nash to be optimal, results suggest nonlinear tournament payoffs based on overall relative rewards are not sufficient to increase Nash results in the one-shot Centipede style setting. Evidence suggests that reducing strategic uncertainty is more important than increasing dominance in promoting Nash play.
Keywords: Centipede game; payoff tournaments; experiment; strategic uncertainty; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00319
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