Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure

Toshihiro Matsumura and Akira Ogawa ()

Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 4, 2117-2127

Abstract: We assume that firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts. We find that a significant (insignificant) asymmetric weight of CSR in their objectives yields Bertrand (Cournot) competition.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility; Cournot; Bertrand; welfare-concern objective (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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